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COLLECTIVE SECURITY v. CONSTITUTIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY: CAN THE PRESIDENT COMMIT U.S.
TROOPS UNDER THE SANCTION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WITHOUT
CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL?
I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 17, 1796, President George Washington announced
his plans not to seek reelection by publishing his Farewell Address in
Philadelphia's Daily American Advertiser.' With the assistance of Al-

exander Hamilton and James Madison in writing the Address, 2 Washington warned that the United States should avoid foreign entanglements in order to remain neutral in international affairs and
3
concentrate on economic and political growth.
On September 11, 1990, President George Bush addressed a Joint
Session of Congress on the United States military presence in Kuwait.

1. THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 168 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & John S. Bowman eds., 1983). Washington's desire to return to his retirement, which first began after the
American Revolutionary War, far outweighed his decision to continue as President following eight
years of dedicated service:
The acceptance of, and continuation hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have
twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to
a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped, that it would have
been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives, which I was not at liberty to
disregard, to return to that retirement, from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The
strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the
preparation of an address to declare it you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and
critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of person
entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea.
HORACE BINNEY, AN INQUIRY INTO THE FORMATION

OF WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

209-10 (De Capo Press 1969) (1859).
2. ALMANAC, supra note 1, at 168.
3. Washington wrote:
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political [connection] as possible. So far as we
have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us
stop. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation . . . . Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties,
in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of
her friendship or enmities . . . . It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances
with any portion of the foreign world . ...
BINNEY. supra note 1, at 222-23; see also IRWIN UNGER, THESE UNITED STATES THE QUESTIONS
OF OUR PAST: To 1877, at 168 (2d ed. 1982).
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President Bush declared that the United States, with the help of its
Operation Desert Shield 4 allies, would achieve a "new world order:"
America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we
will. America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will.
America and the world must stand up to aggression. And we will. And
one thing more: In the pursuit of these goals, America will not be
intimidated.'
The drastic differences between Washington and Bush's statements illustrate the substantial change in United States foreign policy
over the past 194 years. Compared to the late-eighteenth century, the
United States now plays a much more powerful role in the political,
economic, and social affairs of the world. The United States asserts its
influential voice in world affairs through both unilateral and multilateral actions; the latter is done in cooperation with the United Nations.
Though these initiatives have resulted in either the international community's positive reinforcement' or outright disapproval, 7 the United

4. Operation Desert Shield was the code name of the United Nations defensive military
operations in the Persian Gulf from August 9, 1990 to January 16, 1991. Troops from various
countries, with the greatest support coming from the United States, were sent to the region in
order to deter Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from invading Saudi Arabia following Iraq's successful takeover of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Operation Desert Storm was the code name of the
United Nations offensive military operations against Iraq beginning on January 17 and ending
February 28, 1991. Offensive strikes against Iraq began after Iraq's refusal to obey United Nation's Security Council Resolutions to leave Kuwait. For a thorough historical background of
Iraq's claims to Kuwaiti territory, see Majid Khadduri, Iraq's Claim to the Sovereignty of
Kuwayt, 23 J. INT'L L. & POL. 5 (1990). For additional background on the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and the actions taken by the United Nations Security Council leading up to Operation
Desert Storm, see Christopher J. Sabec, The Security Council Comes of Age: An Analysis of the
International Legal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, 21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 63, 6476 (1991).
5. Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1990, at A20.
6. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46,
(1990), reprinted in Sabec, supra note 4, at 122. In Security Council Resolution No. 678, the
Security Council authorized that "Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait
• . . use all necessary means to uphold and implement Security Council Resolution 660 [requiring
Iraq to leave Kuwait]." Id.
7. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S.]. The Court of International Justice decided
"that the United States of America, by [engaging in extensive military support of the contras],
• , * has acted against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary
international law not to violate the sovereignty of another State." Id. at 5. The contras were a
rebel force, assisted by the United States, that attempted to overthrow the Communist-backed
Sandinista government of Nicaragua. Customary international law is defined as the "general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT
(REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1986).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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States continues to play a vital role in world affairs-especially when
international security is at stake.8
The United States' participation in a collective security system9
generates increasing debate about the delegation of foreign affairs
power in the Constitution." More precisely, this debate centers on the
war powers of the President and Congress." For example, the President's authority over the United States' armed forces as Commanderin-Chief may grant him the power to send troops in response to
breaches of international security. On the other hand, the Constitution's explicit delegation of war and appropriations powers to Congress
in Article I may limit the President's control over the United States
military. This apparent conflict of powers raises the issue of whether
the United States should sacrifice its constitutional heritage for the
sake of collective security. This issue is particularly pertinent in light of
Operation Desert Shield/Storm. 2 Following the increased use of presidential military initiatives in Vietnam, Congress preempted any presidential unilateral military action by passing the War Powers Resolu-

8. W. Michael Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic
Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203, 205-06 (1991).
9. The term "collective security system" refers to the theory of members of the United
Nations aiding in the defense of a nation that is threatened with an attack or actually attacked by
another nation. See infra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.

10.

Reisman, supra note 8, at 209-11; see also Louis

HENKIN. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE

15-28 (1972) (overview of foreign affairs powers and interpretations of the Constitution in that area); Charles J. Cooper et al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 165 (1988) (panel of four authors writing on the distribution of foreign
affairs powers); Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 758 (1989) (dealing with the role of Congress in its control over appropriations in foreign
affairs); Elliot L. Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 736
(1989) (emphasizing the difficulty in separating power between the executive and legislative
branches); Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister, or ConstitutionalMonarch?, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 740 (1989) (analyzing congressional action to curb presidential power in foreign affairs
beyond the restrictions developed by the Framers and reasons why the President's modern role
must be defended); Phillip R. Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
750 (1989) (reviewing the need for congressional and presidential control over foreign affairs).
11. Reisman, supra note 8, at 209-11; see also Charles Bennett et al., The President's
Power as Commander-in-Chiefversus Congress' War Power and Appropriations Power, 43 U.
MIAMI L REV. 17 (1988) (panel of five authors writing on the war and foreign affairs powers of
Congress and the President); Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 74-88 (1991) (discussion of the role of the war powers in relation to United
Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing nation-states to use "all necessary means" to
effectuate Iraq's compliance with other United Nations resolutions concerning its occupation of
'Kuwait); Scott D. Clark, Note, Questioning the ConstitutionalDistributionof War Powers in the
Wake of the Iraqi Crisis and Operation Desert Shield/Storm, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 669 (1991) (concerning challenge of President's powers by 54 members of Congress in Dellums v. Bush, 752 F.
Supp. 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
discussion 1991
supra note 4.
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tion (the Resolution). 3 Yet, the United States provided military forces
to protect Saudi Arabia in August of 1990 solely on the initiative of
President Bush. 4 Other than policy statements by several House Democrats denouncing the use of offensive military force' 5 and an unsuccessful attempt at stopping the President in federal court,' 6 the American military build up in the Persian Gulf escalated without any action
by the entire Congress. In fact, Congress never approved the use of
force in the Gulf until it enacted a joint resolution on January 14,
1991, one day before the United Nations deadline for Iraq to withdraw
from Kuwait. 7

13. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)).
The War Powers Resolution was passed during the Vietnam War so Congress could reassert its
constitutional role regarding the use of the United States' military forces. HoUsE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973). In
order to accomplish this task, the Resolution placed limits on the President's use of United States
forces. The resolution required "[tihe President in every possible instance [to] consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or [imminent hostilities]." 50
U.S.C. § 1542 (1988). In addition, when troops are introduced into imminent or actual hostilities,
the Resolution requires the President to report periodically to Congress regarding the status of the
operations. Id. § 1543(c). The most striking limitation on presidential power is the requirement
that the President terminate any military action within sixty days of reporting to Congress, unless
the latter declares war, extends the sixty-day period by law, or is physically unable to meet. Id. §
1544(b). Thus, the Resolution appears to preempt effectively any unilateral military action by the
President. But see infra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. Many articles have been written
concerning the Resolution. For a selected few, see Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The
War Powers Resolution after the Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 767 (1984) (discussion
of the constitutionality of the Resolution's legislative veto); Douglas L. Steele, Covert Action and
the War Powers Resolution, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1139 (1988) (discussion of executive military
actions and the Resolution); Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the President
Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (1984) (former Secretary of State
Vance analyzes the Resolution's historical and constitutional background and its effectiveness);
Clement J. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise, 17 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 579 (1984) (co-author of the Resolution discusses executive-legislative implementation of
the Resolution in the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Administrations); Note, Congressional Control of
Presidential War-Making Under the War Powers Act: The Status of a Legislative Veto after
Chadha, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1217 (1984) (discussion of the constitutionality of the Resolution's
legislative veto); Comment, Realism, Liberalism, and the War Powers Resolution, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 637 (1989) (discusses the main conflicting interpretations of United States' foreign policy
and how this affects the Resolution's interpretation); Martin Wald, Note, The Future of the War
Powers Resolution, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1407, 1409 (1984) ("analysis of practical and legal impediments to congressional control of executive warmaking").
14.
at A15.

Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on the Iraq Crisis, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug. 9, 1990,

15.

Susan F. Rasky, House Democrats Caution Bush on War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990, at

16.

Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

17.

Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat.

A22.

3 (1991).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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This comment begins by examining the importance of a collective
security system supported and enforced through the United Nations. 8
This comment then analyzes the critical role of the United States in a
collective security system and how this role affects the interpretation of
the United States Constitution. This comment next presents an overview of the early foundations of war powers embraced by the Framers
of the Constitution. 9 Following this overview is an analysis of how
scholars interpret constitutional war powers2 ° and how these interpretations evolve through the development of presidential and congressional
influence on the use of force, 2 1 including Operation Desert Shield/
Storm. 2 Finally, this comment suggests prospects for the future of
presidential war powers and the role that Congress must retain in order
to preserve our constitutional sovereignty while simultaneously partici23
pating in a collective security system.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The United Nations Charter and the Use of Force

1. The History of War and Peace in the Nation-State System
In order to fully understand the fundamental development of the
United Nations' restrictions on the use of force, it is important to survey the history of war in the nation-state system. This history reflects
and enhances the need for a collective security system2 that protects
all nations and peoples from oppression and hostility.
Before the formation of the United Nations, the world order was
based upon the nation-state system. 5 Signed in 1648, the Peace of
Westphalia 6 propelled Europe into an era of "distinctive nation-states,

18. See infra notes 24-84 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 115-79 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 180-99 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 200-19 and accompanying text.
24. For a definition of "collective security, system," see supra note 9.
25. The "nation-state system" changed world order dramatically after the Thirty Year's
War (1618-1648). Before and during the war, power was scattered throughout Europe in kingdoms and religious sects. After the war, the nation-state system reflected the existence of a variety
of sovereign governments that were "more-or-less consciously interrelated" by the desire to control
territory and to form "alliances of mutual advantage." I ARNOLD TOYNBEE & EMANUEL CHILL.
MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY. 1648-1967, at 3 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967).
26. The Peace of Westphalia was a compromise that ended the Thirty Year's War. Id. at 4.
The main focus of the Peace was to quell the religious upheaval and battles between rival Catholic
and Protestant sects. Id. More importantly, the Peace included provisions that allowed nationstates that were a part of the Holy Roman Empire to conclude treaties with foreign powers. Id.
This concept initiated the centralization of political authority within European nation-states,
spurredby
nationalistic
influences,
Published
eCommons,
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each with its own political, cultural, and religious identity. ' 27 In order
to protect themselves, the newly independent and sovereign nationstates developed extensive military organizations that eventually expanded warfare to a worldwide scale. 8 As a result of this military
build-up, various struggles for control of territories abroad2 9 and in Europe 30 highlighted the 300 years following the Peace of Westphalia.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the United States
was rarely involved in European affairs.3 " The European nations
worked to perfect cooperation among themselves. Following the reign
of Napoleon,32 the Congress of Vienna exemplified Europe's attempt to
unify the continent.3 3 Eventually, however, European imperialism and
nationalism led to a rise in colonialism as the major European powers

ous political, economic, and military alliances among nation-states. Id. at 3; see also DONALD
KAGAN ET AL., THE WESTERN HERITAGE SINCE 1300, at 529-30 (2d ed. 1983).
27. KAGAN et al., supra note 26, at 464.
28. Id. at 595.
29. In the eighteenth century, the French and British were the dominant forces overseas as
each attempted to gain commercial and colonial supremacy over other European powers. Id. This
eventually led to the Seven Years' War (French and Indian War) in 1756. Id. at 605. By 1763,
the French were soundly defeated, and the British gained a strong foothold in Canada and the
American colonies. Id. at 608. British colonialism eventually expanded to other areas of the world,
including Australia, the Caribbean, India, and South Africa.
30. While Great Britain and France concentrated their efforts overseas, Austria and Prussia
battled for control of Central and Eastern Europe. Id. The War of Austrian Succession (17401748) symbolized this conflict. Prussia, guided by Frederick 1I, attempted to gain control of the
Hapsburg crown in Austria, but he failed due to the perseverance and diplomacy of Austria's
Maria Theresa. Id. at 601.
31. Due to concerns as a developing nation and a split of political opinion, the United States
refused to participate in the French Revolution. IRWIN UNGER: THESE UNITED STATES THE QUESTIONS OF OUR PAST: To 1877, at 163-64 (2d ed. 1982). President Washington's proclamation of
U.S. neutrality in 1793 bolstered the United States' policy of isolationism. THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 163 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & John S. Bowman eds., 1983). Interestingly, James Madison questioned Washington's authority about issuing such a proclamation without first consulting Congress. Id.
32. Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in France in 1799. He orchestrated a series of military campaigns in Europe from 1804-1815 that shocked the world. KAGAN et al., supra note 26,
at 681. His Continental System (1806-1810) consolidated Europe into the French and Grand
Empires prohibiting trade with France's worst enemy, Great Britain. Id. at 691. Eventually, Napoleon's military power dwindled after defeat at the hands of his former ally, Russia, in 1812. Id.
at 692. The Quadruple Alliance (Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia) ended Napoleon's
reign at Waterloo in 1815. Id. at 695-96.
33. Made up of the Quadruple Alliance (Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia), the
Congress of Vienna attempted to prevent a reoccurrence of the "Napoleonic nightmare" by establishing a stable balance of power and methods for adjusting to change in power structures among
European nation-states. Id. at 696. Eventually, differences among the powers led to the negotiation of foreign policy issues via the Concert of Europe, an informal method of consultation that
required a member nation-state of the Congress of Vienna to gain the ascent of other members
before taking any major action in international affairs. Id. at 719. Even through these differences,
the Concert of Europe's goal was to prevent renewed French aggression and create a balance of
power against Russia's increased military might. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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sought to spread their influence and control over the people and natural
resources of various territories throughout the world, particularly Af35
rica.3" Colonialism brought the formation of new military alliances.
These alliances increased tensions throughout Europe and finally
erupted in World War I (1914-1918).3 6 World War I marked the first
time the7 United States became directly involved in a European-based
3
conflict.
The end of World War I brought an initial attempt to unify nation-states into an international organization to maintain world peace.
The Treaty of Versailles, signed in 1919, included a provision for a
"League of Nations," developed by President Woodrow Wilson. 38 Yet,
the self-serving motives of the European powers, including war reparations and decisions on territorial rights, 9 undermined the treaty's goal
of unity and, consequently, the treaty and the League failed. 4" While
Wilson's involvement in the Treaty of Versailles appeared to place the
United States on the threshold of increased involvement in international affairs, the treaty was never ratified by the United States. The
Republican-led Senate withheld its "Advice and Consent"4 1 out of the
fear that the League Covenant legally bound the United States to use
its troops whenever the League mandated. 42 Consequently, what ap-

34. Id. at 870. The most prolific example of vast European colonialism was in Africa, where
Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Spain all partitioned the continent
into colonial territories by 1914. Id. at 872.
35. Id. at 878. The two greatest military alliances were the Triple Entente, which included
Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the Triple Alliance, which included Germany, AustriaHungary, and Italy. Id. at 881-86. Interestingly, the Hague Conference of 1899 and the Second
Hague Conference of 1907 were the "first formal attempts" to prevent hostilities. The agreements
failed, however, and the alliances were formed. Christopher J. Sabec, The Security Council
Comes of Age: An Analysis of the InternationalLegal Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait,
21 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 63, 78 (1991).
36. While World War I was mainly fought in the trenches of Western and Central Europe,
battles were fought around the world in many of the colonial territories of the Triple Entente and
Triple Alliance. KAGAN et al., supra note 26, at 894-900.
37. President Woodrow Wilson did not want the United States involved. Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare and the Russian Revolution, however, inspired Wilson
to join the fight against the Triple Alliance in order " 'to make the world safe for democracy.'"
Id. at 900 (quoting President Wilson). United States involvement tipped the scales in favor of the
Triple Entente and gave Wilson the upper-hand in peace negotiations, where he attempted to turn
the war into a "moral crusade" for international peace. Id. at 907.
38. Id. at 909; see also 2 TOYNBEE & CHILL, supra note 25, at 1274-287.
39. KAGAN et al., supra note 26, at 907-08.
40. Id. at 912-13. Although the League was able to prevent a war between Greece and
Bulgaria in 1925, Italy's invasion of Ethiopia split the League apart in 1935. Sabec, supra note
35, at 79 nn.90 & 93.
41. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
42. Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 63, 75
(1991). by eCommons, 1991
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peared to be the beginnings of continued United States' participation in
foreign affairs through a new world order was nothing more than a
false start.
In the 1930s, there was a resurgence of imperialism and militarism
in Europe. Most importantly, Adolf Hitler's Nazi Party quickly rose to
power on the tide of German nationalism. 4 3 Internal political struggle
in the weakened German power structure allowed Hitler to become the
sole ruler of Germany by 1934." During the next five years, Hitler
rearmed Germany, reoccupied and remilitarized the Rhineland, and
annexed part of Czechoslovakia. "5 In 1939, Hitler's invasion of Poland
started World War 11 (1939-1945)-the second greatest international
struggle."' World War II provided the impetus toward international cooperation to achieve peace and stability in an otherwise militaristic
environment.
2. Development of the United Nations and Restrictions on the Use of
Force
Collective will increased following World War II in an attempt to
devise an organization that outlawed war and created an obligation
among nation-states to settle disputes through peaceful methods rather
than military conflicts. 7 In 1945, delegates from several nations met in
San Francisco to develop such an organization."8 The United Nations
Charter (the Charter), the product of this conference, is a reflection of
the global will to establish the enduring peace that eluded Europe for
almost 300 years. The sovereignty of nation-states still exists, but it is
limited by international law, including the Charter. "9 Among the goals

43. KAGAN et al., supra note 26, at 961. The German economy was in a state of disarray
due to war reparations and the Great Depression enabled Hitler to successfully take over the
country's leadership.
44. Id. at 964.
45. Id. at 979-80, 982-88.
46. Id. at 988-89.
47. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1620 (1984) (often cited, this article discusses the effect the United Nations' Charter has on the
sovereign right of nations to use force as a means of self-defense). Originally, the goal was to
organize the world into a cohesive international organization. The onset of the Cold War, the
nuclear arms race, and the battle of superpower politics and control of the Third World between
the United States and the Soviet Union split the United Nations into two factions, yet elevated its
importance as an organization for peace among nations.
48. ALMANAC, supra note 31, at 500.
49. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 39, 43 (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez). Judge
Alvarez wrote:
We can no longer regard sovereignty as an absolute and individual right of every State, as
used to be done under the old law founded on the individualist [regime], according to
which States were only bound by the rules which they had accepted. [Today], owing to
social interdependence and to the predominance of the general interest, the States are
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23

19921

PRESIDENT COMMITTING U.S. TROOPS

1063

enumerated in the Charter are maintenance of international peace and
security,5" respect for the principles of equality and self-determination, 51 achievement of international cooperation,52 and the promotion of
human rights. 3
With these goals in mind, the drafters of the Charter developed a
plan that curtailed the use of force, while at the same time providing
the United Nations the power to enforce its decrees.5 4 The United Nations' ability to limit the use of force is astounding in light of the difficulty of restricting the sovereign right of a nation to use its military
force, 55 especially when one nation invades another.5 A nation's promise to relinquish its sovereign right to use military force "may not be
worth the paper the promise is written on." 57 Nevertheless, the Charter
attempts to accomplish this task.
Two provisions of the Charter specifically limit the use of force.
First, Article 2(4) of the Charter states: "All members shall refrain in
their internationalrelationsfrom the threat or use offorce against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. '"58
Ironically, the second provision limiting the use of force is found in an
article that is often interpreted to allow the use of force in certain situations. Article 51 states in part: "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an

bound by many rules which have not been ordered by their will. The sovereignty of States
has now become an institution, an internationalsocial function of a psychological character, which has to be exercised in accordance with the new international law.
Id. at 43. Although the Charter has not been ordered against the will of a sovereign nation-state,
as Judge Alvarez describes, the Charter's goals affect a nation-state's sovereignty when it joins the
United Nations as a treaty member. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
50. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1.
51. Id. 2.
52. Id. 3.
53. Id.
54. Article 39, which gives the United Nations the power to repel aggression, provides:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security." UN.CHARTER art. 39. For an
overview of the various provisions granting the United Nations Security Council power to enforce
the Charter, see Sabec, supra note 35, at 85-95. Interestingly, the League of Nations failed to
achieve this goal because member governments did not want to execute the necessary obligations
to enforce peace and prevent war. Leo Gross, The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge
Reservations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 531, 550 (1947).
55. Stanley Hoffman, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELEVANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-39 (Karl Deutsch and Stanley Hoffman eds., 2d ed. 1971).
56. Schachter, supra note 47, at 1632.
57. Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 457 (1991).
2, 4 (emphasis added).
CHARTER art.
58. by
U.N.
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armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."59
While Article 51 appears to allow the use of force in situations
involving self-defense by an individual nation-state or a group of nation-states, the emphasized language of the provision implies that the
Security Council acts as a preemption on nation-state sovereignty.6 0
The drafting history of Article 51, however, evidences no such restriction on the inherent right of self-defense."1 For example, Professor Oscar Schachter 2 believes that, in order to protect their nationals, nationstates have an inherent right to engage in humanitarian intervention
that flows from Article 5 1.63 Nevertheless, there exists the danger that
nation-states will use the self-defense mechanism for "preemptive
strikes and anticipatory defense in response to threats." 4 Israel's
bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, as a means of anticipatory
self-defense65 of future threats to Israeli territory exemplifies the danger of using the self-defense mechanism without an actual attack by

59. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
60. In essence, a strict textual reading of the emphasized clause in Article 51 indicates that
the Security Council could step in and stop any nation-state from defending its borders. See
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS

171-72, 175 (1990); O'Connell, supra note 57,
at 478; Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making:
PrecariousLegitimacy, in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law, 85

AM. J. INT'L L. 516, 520-21 (1991) (challenging the legitimacy of the United Nations to use force
based upon Articles 39, 42, and 51).
61. See Schachter, supra note 47, at 1631-32; see also Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, The Use of
Force and the Law of Nations, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 583, 594-96 (1991) (rejects the idea that
Article 51 limits customary and sovereign right to self-defense, but instead advocates that Article
51 should be read in conjunction with Article 2(4) to promote international peace and the preser-

vation of human rights and self-determination); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement
Action or Collective Self-Defense, in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1991) (argues that self-defense is not preempted by Article 51
and may be enforced by the United Nations); John N. Moore, The Secret War in Central
America and the Future of World Order, WORLD AFF., Fall 1985, at 94 (disagrees with the

I.C.J.'s interpretation of Article 51 limiting self-defense).
62. Professor Schachter, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law and Diplomacy at
Columbia University, has written numerous articles on the topic of international law.
63. Schachter, supra note 47, at 1630 (quoting from 1976 DIGEST OF US. PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 150-51). "Humanitarian intervention" refers to armed intervention by one
nation-state into another nation-state when the latter is engaged in "large-scale atrocities or acute
deprivation," such as torturing or killing an intervening nation-state's nationals. Id. at 1628-29.
64. Id. at 1634.
65. "Anticipatory self-defense" is the armed response of one nation to another nation when
the latter threatens an attack on the defending nation or the defending nation's nationals. Id. at
1633-34. Thus, Israel bombed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 because Iraq "claimed" that it was
"at war with Israel" and the reactor was "intended for a nuclear strike." Id. at 1635. It is
important to note that this was Israel's interpretation of Iraq's action and is not definitive of the actual
reason for the construction of the reactor. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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another nation-state. 66 In addition, the International Court of Justice
Nicara(I.C.J.), following actions by the United States in and against
67
self-defense.
of
right
the
limited
1980s,
early
gua in the
Collective self-defense is a main feature of the Charter. 8 Although the idea of collective self-defense, or collective security, protects
regional agreements already established among nation-states for mutual defense, 9 it also affords the United Nations the ability to enforce
its prohibition on the use of force. 70 That enforcement provision is in
Article 42:
Should the Security Council consider measures provided for in Article
41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or
restore international peace and security. Such action may include demby air, sea, or land forces of
onstrations, blockade, and other operations
71
Members of the United Nations.

Historically, three major problems severely undercut the United
Nations' ability to use force. First, the power of the Security Council is

66. Id. at 1635.
67. The United States mined Nicaraguan harbors and supported the Nicaraguan resistance,
the contras, with military training and weapons in an attempt to oust the communist Sandinista
leadership. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 4, 1 187-201 (June 27); Kirkpatrick, supra note 61, at
588.
68. The collective self-defense provision in Article 51 can be considered a furtherance of the
Monroe Doctrine because the provision was added at the San Francisco Conference in order to
legitimize the security arrangement of the Chapultepec Treaty of 1941. This treaty provided in
part that if an attack on an American state occurred, it was considered an attack upon all American states, which warranted collective action by the group. Schachter, supra note 47, at 1639. But
see RESTATEMENT (REVISED) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 131 cmt. i
(1985) ("It has been commonly assumed that an international agreement cannot itself bring the
United States into a state of war.").
69. This not only includes the Chapultepec Treaty, but the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) as well. Schachter,
supra note 47, at 1639. It is important to note that such "regional arrangements" do not satisfy
the requirements of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Id. Basically, the members of
such "regional arrangements" promise to come to the defense of any member if it is attacked. Id.
This violates the express provision in Article 53 that such action cannot be undertaken "without
1. This violation creates
the authorization of the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 53,
grave problems for Security Council enforcement of such regional arrangements.
70. But see generally Weston, supra note 60.
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 42. Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means
of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
art. 41.
U.N. CHARTER
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hindered by the veto power of its five permanent members. 72 The Cold
War between the United States and the Soviet Union extended to voting in the Security Council. 7 3 The veto power limited the ability of the
Council to act whenever either of these two superpowers disagreed with
the actions or policies of the other .7 4 This problem spawned a second
problem: Article 51 "regional arrangements" undermine the United
Nations' collective security system.7 Countries that were members of
military alliances like NATO or the Warsaw Pact agreed that an attack on a fellow member nation was an attack on all member nations.7 6
These alliances required members to go to war immediately when such
a situation occurred, in effect surpassing the Security Council preemption in Article 51 .7 Third, Article 42 was admittedly subservient 78. to
Article 43 agreements which would have made military forces available
to the Security Council.7 9 The Security Council "never . . . realized
the deterrence value of such a force, let alone the coercive restraint it
might provide" because no Article 43 agreement was ever negotiated. 80
The failure to forge such agreements led to the "organic growth and
the alternative creation" of United Nations police forces under the

72. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council include the United
States, the Soviet Union, China, Great Britain, and France. U.N. CHARTER art. 23,
1. Each of
these countries has a "veto power," which can halt any action to be taken by the Security Council
if any one of them exercises their veto. This result occurs because the Charter requires all matters,
other than procedural matters, to be passed by an "affirmative vote of [the] nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." U.N. CHARTER art. 27,
3. As of this
writing, the Charter has not been amended to allow the Commonwealth of Independent States or
Russia to take the place of the Soviet Union on the Security Council. Consequently, there may
now only be four vetoes in the Security Council.
73. KAGAN et al., supra note 26, at 1014.
74. Id.
75. Schachter, supra note 47, at 1639.
76. Id.; see also discussion at note 68.
77. Schachter, supra note 47, at 1639.
78. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 2, Annex 1, Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. A/656 (1948).
Secretary-General Trygve Lie stated that Article 42 was limited in scope by Article 43 military
agreements in his proposal for the formulation of a United Nations Guard. Id. But see Letter
from Philip C. Jessup to Secretary of State John Marshall (Jun. 21, 1948), in I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1948, at 351-54 (1975) (Jessup states that the Charter provisions
will not be violated if the United Nations Guard carries out "ordinary police functions" not the
invasion of nation-states).
79. Article 43 provides in part:
All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call
and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces . . . necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 43,
1.
80. O'Connell, supra note 57, at 466.
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guise of Article 42.81 Hence, as Professor Schachter has written:
"[Tihe UN political organs provide an institutional mechanism for authoritative judgments on the use of force, but only under some circumstances can they obtain the requisite authority and consequential behavior to endow their decisions with effective power. "82
Within the last three years, the possibilities of the Security Council enforcing collective security have changed dramatically. The advent
of perestroika in the Soviet Union led to the revival of the political
organs of the United Nations.8" Changes in the Soviet Union produced
greater cooperation between the superpowers and a less handicapped
Security Council. The cooperation between the Soviet Union and the
United States in creating and enforcing the sanctions against Iraq after
its invasion of Kuwait 84 and the subsequent victory by United Nations
forces led by the United States both evidence this change. Collective
security is now a reality, not a possibility.
Following the successful liberation of Kuwait and the sudden
breakup of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent
States, the United States has effectively entrenched its fundamental position in this collective security system. The question, however, still remains: Who controls United States armed forces within this collective
security system? Is it a function of the President as Commander-inChief or is it a function Congress and its war-making and appropriations authority?
B.

Interpretation of the Constitution

1. The Framers
In 1787, following nine years of war with Great Britain, the Framers of the Constitution understood the importance of war powers. In the
Framers' era, war was an accepted foreign policy initiative for a sovereign. nation-state.8 5 A decision to go to war had significant ramifications

81. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order
Changeth," in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 63, 66 (1991). These Article 42 police forces did not require agreements to be made. Id.
82. Schachter, supra note 47, at 1622. See generally Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law
in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM.J.INT'L L. 452, 452 (1991) (discusses "Charter provisions involved
expressly or implicitly in the Security Council decisions [and] the implications of those decisions
on future action").
83. For excellent discussions of the changes in the Soviet Union, prior to its dissolution, and
their effect on international law and politics, see Thomas M. Franck, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviving the United Nations System, 83 AM. J.INT'L L. 531
(1989); John Quigley, Perestroika and InternationalLaw, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.788 (1988).
84. See Elaine Sciolino & Eric Pace, Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How the U.S. Convinced the U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990 at Al.
note 57, at 458.
supra 1991
85. by
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because "[wiar terminates relations with the enemy, and abrogates or
suspends treaty obligations and the bulk of rights and duties under international law." 8 6 Past experience with the British monarchy led the
Framers to conclude that the decision to go to war should not be a
foreign policy initiative left in the hands of the President of the United
87
States.
The first step in removing this power from the hands of the President was to divide war powers between the executive and legislative
branches of government. The spread of power among the states led to
the failure of the Articles of Confederation in the late 1780s and the
development of a centralized national government mainly to consolidate
and unify the foreign policy initiatives and defense of the United
States.8 Even with this unification in mind, the Framers stressed the
separation of all power among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches: "In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and
usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into
distinct and separate departments." 89 Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison recognized that "[i]n republican government the legislative
authority, necessarily, predominates,""0 but the role of the executive is
also essential.9 ' Yet, Hamilton saw that when the safety of the Union is
86. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 80 (1972).
87. Alexander Hamilton was adamant on this point:
[T]he President is to be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States.
In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the King of GreatBritain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and
Admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British King extends to the declaring of war
and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by the Constitution under
consideration would appertain to the Legislature.
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 464-65 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961).
James Madison also wrote: "[Ilt has grown into an axiom that the executive is the department of
power most [distinguished] by its propensity to go to war: hence it is the practice of all states, in
proportion as they are free, to disarm this propensity of its influence." Helvidius No. IV, GAZETTE
OF THE UNITED STATES (Philadelphia), Sept. 14, 1793, in 15 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 109
(T. Mason et al., eds. 1985).
88. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961). Economic necessity was also a major consideration.
89. Id. at No. 51, at 350-51 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison); see also JAMES
MADISON. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 271-72 (Gaillard Hunt & James B. Scott eds., 2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
DEBATES].

90. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison) (Wesleyan
Univ. Press ed. 1961).
91. In the Constitutional Convention, Governor Morris stated:
One great object of the Executive is to [control] the Legislature. The Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize [and] perpetuate themselves; and will [seize] those critical moments produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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at stake, boundaries of power cannot be clearly defined.9 2 This delineation between powers is still the source of debate.
When implementing the separation of power in the Constitution,
the Framers quantitatively delegated little war power to the President
and the bulk to Congress.9" Specifically, the enumerated powers of
Congress include the power to declare war, 94 to raise and support armies,9 5 to provide and maintain a navy, 96 and to make rules for the
regulation of the land and naval forces.9 In order to execute these
powers, the Constitution also grants Congress the power to draw money
from the Treasury, so long as it is a consequence of appropriations
made by law. 98 Regarding the war powers of the President, the Constitution includes a single provision that the President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the army, navy, and the militia of the several
states. 99 Though these powers are expressly stated, their definition is
not, and in contemporary times, lines have become blurred.
2.

What Do These Powers Mean?

Interpretation of these provisions is the heart of the debate over
presidential versus congressional war powers. A simple reading of the
words of the Constitution appears to indicate that the President cannot
declare war, however, his ability to make war seems broad.1 00 There is,

the Executive . . . should be the guardian of the people,

. . .

against Legislative tyranny

DEBATES, supra note 89, at 282.
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton)

(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed.
1961).
93. Paradoxically, Madison did not want the President to exert a great deal of control over
war powers, although he believed that the legislature could be the more dangerous branch in a
constitutional system because it had extensive powers and imprecise limits, compared with the
executive and judicial branches. Madison wrote: "[l1t is against the enterprising ambition of this
[legislative] department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
precautions." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961).
94. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. II.
95. Id. cl. 12.
96. Id. cl. 13.
97. Id. cl. 14.
98. Id. § 9, cl. 7.
99. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1.
100. This was done purposely by the Framers at the Constitutional Convention. The original draft of the Constitution granted Congress the power to "make" war. After great debate over
whether the Congress or President should have the power of war, the Framers substituted the
word "declare" for "make." DEBATES, supra note 89, at 418-19. This gave Congress the power to
declare war against another nation and the President the ability to conduct the land and naval
operations of such a war without the hindrance of Congress. Whether the change effectively increased the war powers of the President is another issue, although the substitution also gave the
President authority to "repel war." Id.; see also Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to
Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1773 (1968) (discusses the presidential war
powers vis-a-vis
Congress before
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of course, more to interpreting the Constitution than merely reading
the words of the document. Different interpretations of the Constitution's war powers do exist. For example, one commentator argues that
history has proven Congress can declare war "formally or informally,
expressly or by implication, in advance or by subsequent ratification, by
legislation or resolution, even by merely appropriating funds for the
conduct of war."' 10 ' A second commentator agrees with this view, but
also argues that Congress plays a role in the decision-making of war
before and after the declaration of war." 2 Another set of commentators
maintain that the President can "faithfully execute" the laws of the
United States10 3 without seeking congressional approval if an international agreement (e.g., NATO, United Nations Charter) obligates this
country. to use its military in a defensive action.'0
Though there are different interpretations of the constitutional delegation of war powers, these differences are meant to exist and reflect
some of the most penetrating words ever written by Chief Justice John
Marshall: "[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding.' 0 5 While the debate on how the Framers would have interpreted war powers in light of contemporary issues rages on, 10 6 various interpretations neglect to successfully match today's needs with the
norms and principles of the Constitution itself.'0 7 Professor Eugene
Rostow °8 writes that Chief Justice Marshall's opinion reflects the idea
that "law is not so much what has been said, but rather a pattern of
behavior that society deems right."' 0 9 Consequently, Rostow makes
three critical points regarding constitutional interpretation. "First, the
Constitution is not a prolix code," but an outline of the "structure[s]
and principle[s] of [our] government." ' "10 Second, "the Constitution
leaves ample room for growth and adaptation" to an ever-changing society."' Third, the Constitution's meaning requires "continuity-in

101. HENKIN, supra note 86, at 81.
102. Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 84, 91
(1991).
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl.1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
104. Franck & Patel, supra note 81, at 68.
105. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
106. Daniel E. Lungren & Mark L. Krotoski, The War Powers Resolution After the
Chadha Decision, 17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 767, 798-99 (1984).
107. Charles J. Cooper et al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 197 (1988) (panel of four authors, including Professor Eugene Rostow, writing on the distribution of foreign affairs powers).
108. Professor Rostow, Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs Emeritus at Yale Law
School, has written numerous articles and books on international and constitutional law topics.
109. Cooper et al., supra note 107, at 197.
110. Id. at 188-89.
111. Id. at 189.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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values and broad policy, not in detail-as well as flexibility and adaptation to change."112
The Framer's ideals, however, must be accorded as much weight
as changes in society. Professor W. Michael Reisman recently wrote:
"The Constitution is part of our constitutive process in which we determine how to establish and maintain our fundamental decision-making
institutions so that they can provide liberty, security, and the fulfillment of other constitutional goals in ways optimally consistent with historic values but responsive to contemporary exigencies." 1 1 In addition,
Professor Michael Glennon advocates that "custom" also affects the
"Constitution's meaning and allocation of power."" 4 In other words,
past practice can be indicative of what the Constitution means. By applying these scholars' teachings to the allocation of war powers in the
Constitution, we can discern whether the President's war powers are
more extensive than the actual language of the document seems to
indicate.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Growth of Presidential War Powers Despite Limitations

1. Justifications for Presidential War Powers
Those in favor of presidential authority to use military force without congressional approval find support in the historical development of
presidential control over war powers as justification for their position. 1
Since the founding of the Constitution in 1787, past Presidents

112. Id.
113. W. Michael Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq: International Law and Democratic
Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203, 212 (1991). Professor Reisman is the Wesley N. Hohfield
Professor of Jurisprudence at Yale Law School and a member of the Board of Editors of the
American Journal of International Law. He has written numerous articles on international and
constitutional law topics.
'114. Glennon, supra note 102, at 89. Glennon states that "[a] practice of constitutional
dimension is regarded by both [the executive and legislative] branches as a juridical norm; the
incidents comprising the practice are accepted, or at least acquiesced in, by the other branch." Id.
at 89-90. Professor Glennon is Professor of Law at the University of California Davis School of
Law, former legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and has written numerous
articles on international and constitutional law.
115. With respect to the historical use of force by the President, Professor Louis Henkin
writes:
By repeated exercise without successful opposition, Presidents have established their authority to send troops abroad probably beyond effective challenge, at least where Congress
is silent, but the constitutional foundations and the constitutional limits of that authority
remain in dispute. Such authority no doubt resides somewhere in the government of a
sovereign nation; constitutional Scripture does not explicitly grant it to Congress or deny it
to the President, and it provides some text in support of hisinitiatives.
Louis HENKIN.
FOREIGN 1991
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 53 (1972).
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deployed United States armed forces more than 200 times, while Congress only declared war five of those times."' 6 From actual involvement
in hostilities to actions short of war, executive practice has enlarged the
war powers of the President.11 7 The use of force in Grenada, Libya,
and Panama are recent examples of American participation in hostilities that began under the sole authority of the President.
Since 1945, the increase in presidential authority over the United
States' armed forces occurred in direct correlation with the United
States' increased international role as a superpower. 1 ' This increased
presidential authority, however, is not without limits. Within the
framework of customary international law, the President is still bound
not to interfere in another nation-state's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 1 9 The President must also follow the provisions of any treaty in
accordance with its terms and the Supremacy Clause.12 Regarding the
Charter's provisions on collective security, 12 1 however, "the allocation
of competence [to make decisions for the United States in a collective
security system is] assigned . . . to the [P]resident. ' 12 2 This assignment has given the President the apparent power to enforce collective
security through armed force.' 2 3 The constitutional authority cited
most often for this "power" has been a combination of the President's

116. 137 CONG. REC. S130-SI35 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991).
117. Mark J. Yost, Note, Self Defense or PresidentialPretext? The Constitutionality of
Unilateral Preemptive Military Action, 78 GEO. L.J. 415, 429-32 (1989).
118. Monroe Leigh, State Department legal advisor during the Ford Administration, in a
hearing before the Subcommittee of National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, cited six non-exhaustive circumstances of the President's
inherent constitutional authority to commit American forces to hostilities other than those outlined in the War Powers Resolution (i.e., declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, and
attack upon the United States). Leigh's six circumstances, which demonstrate the United States'
increased capacity as a military power and international diplomatic leader, include the power:
[I] to rescue American citizens abroad, [2] to rescue foreign nationals where such action
directly facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, [3] to protect U.S. Embassies and
Legations abroad, [4] to suppress civil insurrection, [5] to implement and administer the
terms of an armistice or cease-fire designed to terminate hostilities involving the United
States, and [6] to carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties.
War Powers: A Test of Compliance Relative to the Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom
Penh, the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Incident, 1975: Hearings Before Subcomm.
on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1975).
119. Charles J. Cooper et al., What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 165, 185 (1988) (panel of four authors writing on the distribution of foreign affairs
powers).
120. Id.; US. CoNsT. art. 6, cl.2.
121. See supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text.
122. W. Michael Reisman, Some Lessons from Iraq: InternationalPolitics and Democratic
Politics, 16 YALE J.INT'L L. 203, 210 (1991).
123. Id.
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commander-in-chief and foreign affairs powers.124 For example, in the
Korean conflict, President Truman relied on his executive, treaty, commander-in-chief, and foreign affairs powers to initiate hostilities. 125
Yet, presidential reliance upon the commander-in-chief and foreign affairs powers is misplaced. There are constitutional limits to presidential
war powers, and any such reliance can not break those barriers.
2.

The Constitutional Limitations

Presidential reliance on the foreign affairs power to justify committing troops to war or to actions short of war is dangerous and results
in "abuse and tyranny.' 126 While the President is in a much better
position to articulate the foreign policy of the United States,12 7 he
should not rely on this power to use military force without congressional consent. By delegating to Congress the power to declare war, the
Framers intended to make Congress a participant in the decision-making process regarding military operations. In addition, the checks and
balances of the Constitution indicate that foreign affairs is a shared
power between Congress and the President. For example, Congress'
plenary power over appropriations"2 is a significant foreign policy tool
for Congress, as evidenced by its refusal to continue funding for the
Vietnam War in the 1970s and for the Nicaraguan contras in the
1980s. It can be argued that Congress, by seeking to limit the President's foreign policy through appropriations bills, would be usurping
the power of the President. 2 9 In other words, Congress oversteps its
role when it undertakes to dictate specific foreign policy terms to the
President. 13 0 With regard to the use of military forces, however, this
argument has one flaw: Congress has the constitutional authority to
raise and support armies and, therefore, can decide when and how it
wants to fund the military. Hence, "the foreign affairs source of au-

HENKIN, supra note 115, at 50.
See Alissa Pyrich, Comment, United Nations: Authorization of Use of Force, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 265, 271-72 (discussion of United Nations and United States involvement in the
Korean War); Yost, supra note 117, at 421-22 n.33 (footnote discusses relevant materials and
information regarding Truman's exercise of power in Korea).
126. Yost, supra note 117, at 421 n.33.
127. Justice Sutherland wrote:
[The President], not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which'
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has confidential
sources of information. He has agents . . . . Secrecy in respect of information gathered by
them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful
results.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
129. Cooper et al., supra note 119, at 202.
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thority to direct the military must stop where the congressional and
presidential war powers begin." 131

The use of the Commander-in-Chief Clause as a basis for presidential authority to deploy armed forces is also misplaced. Basically,

"[t]he President is Commander-in-Chief only with regard to such
armed forces as Congress provides . .. ".
"I' This is an essential element of our Constitution. The Framers intended to divide war powers
between the executive and legislative branches to avoid the possibility
of the President making the lone decision to declare war. 133 Once Congress declares war, there is no doubt that the President has control over
the conduct of making war. In contrast, in the absence of a formal
13 4
declaration of war, Congress should regulate any military action.
3. Effect of the United Nations Participation Act (UNPA)
Outside of constitutional limits, the United Nations Participation
Act (UNPA) was the first congressional limit1 35 placed on presidential
war powers.13 6 Recognizing the importance of swift and effective
United Nations action against aggressors,1 - 7 Congress provided the
framework for participation by the United States. In passing the
UNPA, Congress made certain that use of United States military
forces in any collective security system was conditioned on the establishment of Article 43 agreements 3 8 "in accordance with . . .respective constitutional processes." ' 9 The UNPA makes it clear that, if
such agreements are negotiated, the President does not have to seek

131. Yost, supra note 117, at 421 n.33.
132. Charles Bennett et al., The President's Power as Commander-in-Chief Versus Congress' War and Appropriations Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 17, 37 (1988) (panel of five authors
writing on the war and foreign affairs powers of Congress and the President).
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wesleyan Univ. Press ed. 1961); DEBATES, supra note 89, at 418-19.
134. Thomas M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic Invocation"?, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 766, 772 (1989) (discussing the importance of Chief Justice Marshall's
decision in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), which held that, "in the absence of a
formal declaration of war, Congress can regulate the parameters of less formal hostilities").
-135. The second significant congressional limit was the Resolution. See infra notes 154-77
and accompanying text.
136. Pub. L. No. 79-264, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e
(1988)). The purpose of the UNPA was "[t]o provide for the appointment of representatives of
the United States in the organs and agencies of the United Nations, and to make other provision[s] with respect to the participation of the United States in such organization." Id.
137. Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old
Order Changeth," in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 63, 66 (1991).
138. 22 U.S.C. § 287d (1988) ("The President is authorized to negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Council which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate Act or joint resolution . . .in accordance with article 43 of [the] Charter.").
139. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1 3.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
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authorization from Congress to act pursuant to a United Nations resolution on the use of force under Article 42.140 Even so, Article 43
agreements would give control over any designated troops to the Security Council, not the President. Since this is the only congressional act
allowing for the specific use of United States military forces without
congressional approval, the negative implication of the UNPA is that
the President cannot use military force at all without congressional
approval.
When Congress passed the UNPA, it emphasized that any United
Nations enforcement of Article 42 "would not be an act of war but
would be an international action for the preservation of the peace and
for the purpose of preventing war, [thus], the provisions of the Charter
do not affect the exclusive power of Congress to declare war. 1 41 Congress, therefore, recognized the importance of the United Nations as a
peacekeeping international organization. Still, presidential action since
Congress passed the UNPA in 1945 borders on the grey area between
peacekeeping and war-making. By signing the Charter, the United
States agreed to seek and enforce the guiding principles of peace embodied in the treaty. 4 2 In spite of these principles, whether the many
conflicts in which the United States has engaged since 1945 were for
the enforcement of peace is debatable. In response, Congress has taken
the lead in attempting to enforce its own war powers to counteract the
increase in presidential use of force.
B. The Decline in Congressional Influence over Presidential War
Powers
1. Congress in the Collective Security System
Congress is considered to be "a major architect of [the] international system and an indispensable player in U.S. operations within
it. 1 43 Due to the United States' vital role in a collective security system, it is important that American participation be "assured and credible" via congressional and public support.' 4 ' The fact that a collective
security system exists signifies a limit on national sovereignty. Provi-

140.
141.

22 U.S.C. § 287d (1988).
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 79TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON

NATIONS 8, 9 (Comm. Print 1945).
142. During debate on the United Nations Charter, Senator Lucas stated that "the importance of this document cannot be overestimated. I am convinced that this is the beginning of a
lasting and durable peace. And if my prophecy proves to be correct, the Charter will rank among
the greatest documents of history." 91 CONG. REC. 8008, 8019 (1945) (statements during Senate
debates regarding advice and consent on the United Nations Charter).
143. Reisman, supra note 122, at 209.
144.
Id.
Published
by eCommons,
1991
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
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sions in the Charter, however, demonstrate the unwillingness of sovereign nation-states to surrender their independence in order to enforce
measures that would be in direct conflict with the needs and policies of
their own people and government. For example, Article 2 declares that
the "[o]rganization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality
of all its Members,"1 5 while Article 43 includes the provision that all
special military agreements be negotiated "in accordance with . . .respective constitutional processes."' 4 6 Ignoring the Charter's consistent
recognition of nation-state sovereignty, in order to enforce collective security, amounts to destroying a basic notion of the Constitution-Congress declares war, not the President.
The President has no choice in deciding whether to seek congressional approval to go to war.1 4 7 According to the Supreme Court, Congress has the sole authority to declare war in the United States.' 4 8 The
Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war because, in a representative government, Congress better reflects a diversity of opinion
among the people.' 49 It is the people, acting through their representatives, who should decide whether this country should go to war.' 50 In a
collective security system, the greatest danger of "unwanted and unchecked" use of force by the President occurs when he uses the armed
forces in a unilateral military action, "free of the constraints imposed
by having to work within the Security Council."'' Even if the President acts within those constraints:
[a] hortatory resolution of the Council, or one authorizing use of force
but not requiring it, can have no effect on the U.S. domestic system of
reallocating constitutionally assigned power; that a right exists under international law to take certain action says nothing about whether a
power exists under domestic law to exercise that right. The allocation of
domestic power is directed by the Constitution, not by international law.
For this reason, Article 51 cannot be read to confer a power on the Pres-

145. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1.
146. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, 1 3.
147. Clement J. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record and Future Promise,
17 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 579, 581 (1984).
148. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); Home Building & Loan Assoc. v.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931).
149. Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the Constitution, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 84, 88
(1991).
150. Id.
151. Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in Agora: The Gulf Crisis in Internationaland Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74,
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
78 (1991).
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ident to use force without congressional consent when he is asked to do
so in collective self-defense by a state subject to armed attack. 52
Congress alone has the power to send the United States military into
combat, regardless of presidential or international initiatives. Congress,
however, has allowed presidential war power to expand despite its attempts to halt the growth.
The major influence in the growth of presidential war power is the
"radical contextual changes" that have taken place since the founding
of the Constitution. 153 The United States role has changed dramatically
since the times of neutrality in the late eighteenth century. Increased
American presence on the international scene and changes in military
power (e.g., nuclear weapons) have led to an insightful reading of the
constitutional powers delegated to each branch. 154 Likewise, a number
of "national constitutive changes" have occurred, including the growth
of media influence in society, the erosion of the national party structure, the lack of capacity for bipartisan politics, and an increase in business and bureaucratic interests.'5 5 These changes spawned increased
"aggravation of interbranch relations."1 56 Before the Vietnam era,
Congress was fairly liberal in allowing Presidents latitude when using
United States armed forces. 57 During the Vietnam era, however,
American discontent with the ever-increasing presidential use of military forces without the input of Congress gave congressional leaders the
impetus to curb presidential war power by drafting the War Powers
Resolution.' 5 8 Although a stable solution at the time it was passed, the
Resolution has never served the best interests of Congress in a collective security system.

152. Id. at 81. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in remarks on the United Nations' support of military involvement in Korea in 1950, also states: "As for the United Nations resolutions, while they
justified American military action under international law, they could not serve as a substitute for
the congressional authorization required in national law by the Constitution." ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 133-34 (1973).
153.

Glennon, supra note 151, at 81.

154. See. e.g., Peter Raven-Hansen, Nuclear War Powers, 83 AM. J.
(changing contexts of war powers in the nuclear age).

INT'L

L. 786 (1991)

155. W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, 83 AM. J.
L. 777, 780 (1989).

INT'L

156.

Id. at 781.

157.

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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The Failure of the War Powers Resolution

It has been difficult for Congress to withhold presidential action
due to the need to present a unified foreign policy. 159 The strongest
attempt to date has been the Resolution. 6 While the Resolution was
meant to cutback on presidential "adventurism, "161 three major failures
of the Resolution limit its effectiveness.
First, Presidents have complied with the Resolution in a halfhearted manner; even when Presidents have complied, they have done
so by altering the terms of the Resolution.' 62 Presidents have been able
to alter the Resolution's terms because Congress has shown little vigor
For example, under the Resolution
in enforcing the Resolution.'
"[t]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress
before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances . .1.6.""4 When President Carter authorized the
United States forces to fly into Iran in an unsuccessful attempt to rescue American hostages in 1980, he never consulted Congress because:
(1) the situation did not involve "hostilities or imminent hostilities;"
and (2) since the Resolution did not limit the President's constitutional
authority, it did not limit the President's "inherent authority to conduct
rescue operations."' 6 15 Congress never sought any justifications for the
President's authority to use military force and override the consultation
requirement of the Resolution.'6
This is just one example of one President's "creative evasion" of
the terms of the Resolution,' 6 7 but it underscores the second major fail-

159. A single and unified foreign policy is important in order to accommodate other countries for three reasons: (1) we should not have a number of foreign policies with one country; (2)
many countries are disgusted by and cannot understand a situation where the President negotiates
a treaty, but the Senate proceeds to block any chance of an enforceable treaty by refusing to give
its "advice and consent;" and (3) and the country needs to show cooperation and unity within the
government, especially against our enemies. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; see
also Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 406 (1989).
160. See discussion supra note 13. While there is a great deal of debate over the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Resolution, this article makes the assumption that it is constitutional, except for the provision regarding congressional veto in section 5(e) which, by implication, was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Immigration and Naturalization
Services v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
161. Bennett et al., supra note 132, at 38.
162. Franck, supra note 134, at 768.
163. Id.
164. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (1988).
165. Zablocki, supra note 147, at 585.
166. Id. at 585-87.
167. For additional examples of the President's failure to follow the terms of the Resolution
when engaging the United States armed forces in "hostilities or imminent hostilities," see Jules
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
Lobel, Covert War and CongressionalAuthority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA.
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ure of the Resolution-vague terminology. An argument can be made
that the Resolution is a legislative delegation of power that allows the
President to conduct a war without congressional approval for sixty
days.1" 8 In other words, the Resolution apparently creates permissive
presidential military control for sixty days before such actions are considered unconstitutional. Reading the Resolution as such disregards the
legislative purpose 69 and ignores the Resolution's reminder that
"[n]othing in [the Resolution] . . .shall be construed as granting any
authority to the President . . .[that] he would not have had in absence
of [it]."' 70 In addition, whether "imminent hostilities or hostilities" is
the same as "war," within the meaning of the Constitution, is a question of interpretation that has been another source of "creative evasion" for Presidents.171 The resulting confusion creates difficulties in

L. REV. 1035 (1986); Capt. Samuel R. Maizel, U.S.A., Intervention in Grenada,35 NAV. L. REV.
47 (1986); Douglas L. Steele, Covert Action and the War Powers Resolution, 39 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1139 (1988) (United States' involvement in various covert operations); Margaret J.
Wachenfeld, Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U.S. Response in the Persian Gulf, 1988 DUKE L.J.
174 (1988); Zablocki, supra note 147, at 579-98 (includes evaluation of Danang sealift,
Cambodian evacuation, Saigon evacuation, Mayaguez incident, the Iran hostage rescue operation,
dispatch of military personnel to El Salvador, and military involvement in Lebanon); Yost, supra
note 117, at 418-21 (bombing of Libyan chemical weapons plants).
168. Bennett et al., supra note 132, at 51-53. The Resolution includes the following
provision:
Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or required to be submitted . . . the
President shall terminate any use of the United States Armed Forces . . .unless Congress
(1)has declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States
Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physically unable to
meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States.
50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1988). By applying Justice Jackson's tripartite, conceptual framework on the
separation of powers articulated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63738 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), one can see how the President's action could be constitutional
for sixty days. While the first tier, actual congressional delegation, is the greatest source of presidential power, it does not apply to the Resolution. The second tier allows the President to use his
own concurrent constitutional power when Congress is silent on an issue. Since Congress does not
grant or deny the President the authority to use troops for sixty days, arguably a "zone of twilight" allows the President to use his own authority as Commander-in-Chief to commit troops to
action, as has been done in the past. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text. Even if
Congress does not act, on the sixtieth day the President's authority to use military forces falls into
th third tier, where it is at its "lowest ebb," since Congress explicitly forbids the use of troops
after sixty days in the Resolution.
169. The purpose of the Resolution is to "fulfill the intent of the [Framers] and insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of
United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or [imminent hostilities], and to the continued use of
such forces in hostilities ...." 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1988).
170. Id. § 1547(d)(2).
171. The word "hostilities" was a substitute for the word "armed conflict" in order to
broaden the scope of the Resolution. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs believed "hostilities" included "a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired but where there is a
clear and present danger of armed conflict" while "imminent hostilities" included situations where
"therebyiseCommons,
a clear potential
either for such a state of confrontation or for actual armed conflict."
Published
1991
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establishing foreign policy and there is no decrease in presidential use
of force. 172 For example, it is debatable whether the entrance of United
States armed forces into Saudi Arabia after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
created a sense of "imminent hostilities." Overall, the Resolution
should answer constitutional questions with simplicity, clarity, and certainty instead of creating debate about the wisdom of a particular engagement and its concomitant political ramifications. 7 3
The third failure of the Resolution is the judiciary's reluctance to
assess presidential war powers. This reluctance is founded in the political question doctrine. The political question doctrine holds that if a
policy determination should be answered by the political branches of
government, but is presented instead to a court for review, the court
will not decide the issue.'17 The political question doctrine allows courts
to dismiss war powers and foreign policy cases based on separation of
powers concerns and/or -an unwillingness to define "war.' 75 The
United States' intervention in the Persian Gulf in 1991, however, led
one federal court to disregard the political question doctrine and, instead, consider the war powers issue. In Dellums v. Bush,' 7 6 fifty-four
members of Congress filed suit against President Bush in the Federal
District Court of the District of Columbia, following Bush's announcement of a substantial increase in troop deployments to the Persian Gulf
in November 1990.777 In his decision, Judge Greene noted that
"[w]hile the Constitution grants to the political branches, and in particular to the Executive, responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign affairs, it does not follow that the judicial power is excluded from

H.R. REP. No. 287, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 7 (1973).
172. Franck, supra note 134, at 768.
173. Id.
174. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
175. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 936 (1952);
Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21
(1936); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1082 (1981); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Da Costa v. Laird, 448
F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
509, 512-13 (D.D.C. 1990); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 339-41 (D.D.C. 1987); SanchezEspinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596, 600 (D.D.C. 1983), affid, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1982), afj'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1972), afl'd,
411 U.S. 911 (1973); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863). Since Congress had not
declared so, the Court was asked to determine whether the Civil War was a "war" within the
terms of the Constitution, but refused because it could not "affect a technical ignorance of the
existence of a war, which all the world acknowledges to be the greatest civil war known in the
history of the human race." The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 669.
176. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
177. Id. at 1143.
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the resolution of cases merely because they may touch upon such affairs."' 7 8 Nevertheless, relying on Justice Powell's opinion in Goldwater
7 9 Judge Greene
v. Carter,"
went no further because the plaintiffs did
not represent a majority of Congress "seek[ing] an order from the
courts to prevent [the President] from in effect declaring war." 180 At
the least, Dellums set a precedent of inquiry that future courts may
follow if a majority of Congress seeks judicial remedy against the
President.
In summary, Congress has a difficult time enforcing its own decla-.
ration on the limits of presidential war power. Although the Resolution
has not met a test of compliance compatible in scale with Vietnam,
Operation Desert Shield/Storm gave Congress a monumental opportunity to reassert its authority over the dispatch of military forces. Considering the collective security issues at the heart of the enforcement of
the United Nations resolutions against Iraq, it became imperative that
Congress reinforce its role for future collective self-defense initiatives.
C.

Constitutional War Powers in the Persian Gulf

An assessment of Operation Desert Shield/Storm proves that the
biggest problem facing enforcement of Congress' war powers is the political tides that guide the policies of its members. While members of
Congress concerned themselves with how the war played at home, President Bush led the United States into a prominent position in the collective security system of the United Nations. Many lessons can be
learned from Operation Desert Shield/Storm, but none is greater than
the need for Congress to be more definitive in asserting and enforcing
its war powers.
1. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Collective Security System
for the United States
There is no question that Operation Desert Shield/Storm solidified
the United States as the "backbone" of the United Nations collective
security system. 8 ' Through a process of outstanding diplomacy, 8 ' the
United States managed to push resolutions against Iraq's invasion of

178. Id. at 1146.
179. 444 U.S. 996, 997-1002 (1979). Justice Powell argued that judicial review of a dispute
between the President and Congress is not available until Congress has applied all of its constitutional authority to resolve the dispute and this can only be accomplished by Congress as a whole.
Id. at 997. The case concerned the President's termination of a treaty with Taiwan. Id.
180. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1151.
181. Reisman, supra note 122, at 205 ("the system of world order ... continues to depend
centrally on the United States").
182. See Elaine Sciolino & Eric Pace, Putting Teeth in an Embargo: How the U.S. ConPublished
1991Aug. 30, 1990 at Al.
vincedby
theeCommons,
U.N.,.N.Y. TIMES,
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Kuwait through the Security Council while, at the same time, extending American leadership in foreign policy by "executive
initiation."' 83
Since support from the United Nations is a viable and useful tool
for the United States,"" the collective security system influences American policy in two ways. First, while the United States should continue
'
to develop military capacity for a "sufficient range of exigencies," 185
the expense of the collective self-defense effort against Iraq demonstrates the limited capability of the United States to complete a unilateral military enterprise without outside assistance.18 6 New dependence
on the collective security system will shift American policy toward
forming alliances with countries who have economic power rather than
military power. 8 7 Second, the need to maintain the availability and
viability of the United Nation's collective security system may force
American policymakers to reconsider the United States' commitment
to unilateral military options.1 8 ' This means the United States will have
to come to terms with its own use of force in such areas as Central
America and the Caribbean. If the United States were to demand enforcement of the principles of peace and self-determination against
other countries, but ignore the same principles in its own foreign policy,
then the United States could lose needed respect and support of the
United Nations.
Influencing American policies in various parts of the world is an
important role for Congress, and this can be achieved through its plenary appropriations power.' 8 9 Congress can still freely appropriate, but
if Congress does not utilize its power to influence presidential military
initiatives, it will gradually lose a foothold in future foreign policy
formulations.
2. Political Objectives of Congress Cannot Override Constitutional
Ones
Operation Desert Shield/Storm demonstrated that Congress is
concerned more with political objectives than with constitutional ones.
When President Bush dispatched troops to the Persian Gulf only six

183. Phillip R. Trimble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT'L L., 750,
754 (1984) ("ideology of U.S. foreign policy" is the "notion of U.S. example and leadership in
world affairs that requires executive initiation").
184. Reisman, supra note 122, at 207-08.
185. Reisman, supra note 155, at 777.
186. Edwin M. Smith, The U.S., the U.N., and the Persian Gulf Crisis-A united effort to
enforce a global constitution, L.A. LAWYER, Nov. 1990, at 39, 42.
187. Id. at 42.
188. Id. at 41.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss3/23
189. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7.
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days after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, no member of Congress objected.1 90 When United States warships fired on Iraqi tankers in the
Persian Gulf on August 19, there was still no reaction from Congress,
even though hostilities seemed imminent. 9 1 In fact, "broad public support for the President's handling of the crisis," led many Congressmen
to "avoid any comments suggesting that they might be trying to undermine President Bush's commitment to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait."1 92 This led the Senate and House of Representatives to pass
overwhelmingly resolutions supporting Bush's actions in the Gulf, although the resolutions made certain that future decisions about military action would be tied to "United States constitutional and statutory
processes."' 93 The uncertainty of voters' sentiments and the situation in
the Persian Gulf probably led most members of Congress to take a
"wait-and-see" approach regarding support for Bush. Perhaps Congress
was content to let Bush take the political heat from a failed operation.
Still, Congress should not have disregarded the influence and input it
deserved in the initial stages of the decision-making.
Originally, the United States maintained a defensive posture in the
Persian Gulf to protect Saudi Arabia. 94 On November 7, 1990, the
United Nations warned the United States that any use of offensive milSitary force would require sanction of the Security Council. 9 5 The following day, President Bush announced the need for an "adequate offensive military option" and doubled the size of the United States forces in
the Gulf.'
It was significantly past the sixty-day time limit for removal of troops as required by the Resolution. 9 7 Only then did Congress finally raise its voice and "ask from what source the chief execu-

190. Glennon, supra note 149, at 100. On August 9, President Bush reported to Congress
that he did not believe "involvement in hostilities was imminent," thus the sixty-day time limit of
the Resolution did not begin. Congress accepted this assessment of the situation, despite the volatile conditions of the region. Id.
191. Smith, supra note 186, at 41. In enforcing the boycott of all Iraqi exports authorized
by Security Council Resolution 661, United States warships stationed in the Persian Gulf fired on
Iraqi tankers to prevent them from leaving the Gulf. Id.
192. Susan F. Rasky, From Congress, Praise and Muted Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 12,
1990, at A20. House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt stated in a news conference: "Here at
home, the sense of unity and the absence of widespread opposition to this action in the Persian
Gulf testify to our powerful, instinctive feeling that this is a cause worth standing and fighting
for." Id.
193. Susan F. Rasky, House Democrats Caution Bush on War, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1990,
at A22.
194. Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on the Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1990, at A15.
195. Thomas L. Friedman, Allies Tell Baker Use of Force Needs U.N. Backing, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at A14.
196. Glennon, supra note 149, at 86.
Published 197.
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tive drew this extraordinary authority to place the nation at war
without legislative approval. 198 By the end of the year, the Bush Administration was met head-on with congressional attempts to limit its
power over the use of force in the Persian Gulf. Bipartisan support for
Bush's actions began to crumble as Congress realized the potential consequence of United Nations Resolution 678 authorizing the use of
force.199
Finally, after weeks of neglect, on January 14, 1991, Congress approved the use of force against Iraq by passing a joint resolution, which
read in part: "Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of
the War Powers Resolution . .

.

.Nothing in this resolution supersedes

any requirement of the War Powers Resolution." 2 '
Congressional actions during Operation Desert Shield/Storm were
not noteworthy for advocates of congressional control of military forces.
By giving President Bush a great deal of leeway in his original deployment of troops, Congress may have set a precedent for future administrations. On the other hand, by passing a joint resolution on the use of
force that relied on the Resolution, Congress did not let all of its war
powers slip away. This is bittersweet consolation, though, compared to
what should have been an unqualified use of congressional war power
from the beginning of the crisis. In short, Congress missed an excellent
opportunity to assert a greater role in a collective security system.
D.

Prospects for the Future of Congressional War Powers

The roles of Congress and the President in a collective security
system can best be summed up by quoting Professor Reisman:
It is clear beyond cavil that no president can or should conduct an extended military action abroad without wide popular support, which Congress reflects, and, in part, shapes . .

.

.But in matters concerning col-

lective security, Congress has two alternatives. It can either: (1) support
executive action in the diplomacy and repositioning that is so important
if a collective security system is to avoid overt conflict; or (2) withhold
support, thereby reducing the credibility of the collective security system,
resulting in a corresponding increase in the need for the development of
national and foreign armaments as the world turns to a system of individual security.20 1
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It is important for Congress to understand the problems that mar
the current status of the collective security system. Congress must work
with the President to unify the foreign policy and promote the new
collective security position of the United States.2" 2 Yet, at the same
time, Congress cannot and should not allow the President to usurp congressional war powers to further the interests of the collective security
system over the Constitution. As discussed above, perhaps it is time for
Congress to enact a legislative framework to guarantee its participation
in a collective security system. The natural starting point in congressional war powers reform is with the Resolution.
The problems with the Resolution are intermixed with difficulties
in maintaining the constitutional allocation of war powers. Among the
primary problems is a "[f]ack of [c]larity in the [o]riginal [constitutional] [s]cheme" regarding the term "war."203 It is uncertain what
types of force the Framers thought Congress could control.2 0 4 The term
can stand for "symbolic" use of force via a "big stick" policy of showing off military might to deter would-be aggressors. 0 5 On the other
hand, the term can mean the "actual" use of force in war. The Resolution furthers the confusion with the terms "hostilities" and "imminent
hostilities."
It is vital that the limits of the Resolution be defined in order to
secure the correct application of its provisions. Not only should the
above terms be defined, but the reporting requirements should be as
well. This will clarify situations like the Persian Gulf, where any number of events could have activated the sixty-day time period. 06 For example, on September 16, 1991, when President Bush told the Iraqi people that their nation and the United States were "on the brink of war,"
if a well-written reporting requirement and a well-defined "hostilities"
provision in the Resolution existed, the sixty-day time period would
20 7
have been triggered.
Along with the need to redefine key terms and provisions, Congress should amend the Resolution to foster judicial review. ° The
courts should not remain silent on the delegation of war powers, espe-

202. For example, one problem in the past has been the Senate's failure to give its "advice
and consent" on treaties, like the Treaty of Versailles. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying
text. In order to shape a genuine united political front in foreign relations, the Senate must consider the effect its denial of "advice and consent" will have in international relations as well as at
home.
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cially with the increased leverage the United States has in collective
security actions after Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The courts
should draw a bright line where presidential war power begins and
ends, otherwise the President, not the courts, will become the "ultimate
arbiter" of the Constitution.2 0 9 In addition, the legislature and executive have a right to know their respective war powers limits, and these
guidelines can be obtained with some finality from an authoritative judicial decision. 210 By legislating jurisdiction over war powers issues to
the federal courts, Congress might settle the problems facing interpretation of the Resolution. There are problems with this idea, however.
First, as legal precedent, the political question doctrine and issues of
justiciability and ripeness are not going to be easy to overcome.2 1 Second, as long as the use of force in the collective security system remains
a confusing mass of unsettled precedent, courts will remain unable to
decide war powers issues with a definitive bright line.21 2
Another possible amendment to the Resolution is to create a "genuine collaboration of decision-making between the branches." 2 The
development of a joint military committee of congressional leaders and
high-ranking executive officials is a possibility. Additionally, the Resolution could incorporate provisions 'prohibiting certain uses of force by
the President, as long as this provision is backed by "prohibitions on
funding" by Congress. 214 Facially, these suggestions seem plausible but
may not be workable. Although Congress might achieve a greater role
in decision-making regarding the use of military force, establishing a
joint military committee creates adverse ramifications. First, the decision to go to war, including actions short of war, should be made by the
entire Congress,21 5 not a small number of congressional leaders in a
committee. The Framers intended the people, through their representa-

209. Id. at 94.
210. Id.
211. Franck, supra note 134, at 774-75.
212. Comment, Realism, Liberalism, and the War Powers Resolution, 102 HARV. L. REV637, 655 (1989).
213. Glennon, supra note 149, at 100.
214. Id. One of the major stumbling blocks in congressional and presidential war powers is
the following theory: If Congress is appropriating funds for presidential military initiatives over a
long period of time, Congress' appropriations are held to be approvals of military force. HENKIN,
supra note 115, at 81. The Supreme Court has ruled that "[plast practice does not, by itself,
create power, but [a] 'long, continued practice' " by Congress creates the assumption of congressional approval and consent to the action. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981)
(citation omitted). The fallacy in this theory lies in the fact that Congress would never cut funding for any presidential military initiative because Congress would be denying United States
troops ammunition, food, and other supplies. The actual issue is whether unilateral presidential
action creates a fait accompli, which Congress cannot circumvent. If it does, the argument that
such appropriations indicate approval rests on a weak foundation.
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tives, to decide whether and when to go to war. This principle must be
upheld. Second, the decision-making during war is already allocated to
the President as Commander-in-Chief, 216 without congressional involvement. The separation of powers established by the Framers makes this
evident. 21 7' Third, by involving other leaders in the decision-making
during war, there is potential for disagreement over military operations
and leakage of information and secrets. Fourth, banning certain uses of
force, backed by prohibitions of congressional funding, could not possibly cover every future situation where the involvement of United States
armed forces may actually occur or be required. Hence, problems will
not be alleviated by this proposal.
Finally, it may be time for the President and Congress to collaborate and approve Article 43 agreements in order to commit forces to
the United Nations collective security system. Professor Glennon believes these agreements should be incorporated into the Resolution.2"'
While this is a fine proposal, it would be better to make these agreements separate from the Resolution. Thus, the Resolution would pertain to the powers of the President and Congress with regard to forces
under the control of the United States only, while separate Article 43
agreements would deal with forces allocated to the United Nations Security Council and under the control of a revived Security Council Military Staff Committee.2 19 In addition, while these agreements should be
made in accordance with the UNPA, the President and Congress
should negotiate Article 43 agreements together rather than the President alone, as called for in the UNPA.2 2 ° In other words, the UNPA
must be amended to allow collaboration between the executive and legislative branches on these agreements. Since the President is the United
States' international representative and is delegated the constitutional
authority to make treaties,2 21 Congress should only pass detailed and
extensive UNPA amendments or legislation to guide the President's decision-making regarding Article 43 agreements in order to accomplish

216.
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the necessary collaboration between the branches. Such amendments or
legislation will guarantee congressional involvement in the use of
United States armed forces in the collective security system without
extensively interfering in the constitutional powers of the President.
Undoubtedly, these reforms would be an ideal solution to an evergrowing problem. It is important for Congress to take a greater role in
war powers in order to limit presidential control over the United States'
armed forces. It is equally important that the two "develop a will to
share power" if these reforms are to work.22 2 Above all, Congress must
avoid the current trend of delegation, authorization, acquiescence, and
tolerance of presidential usurpation of war powers.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Congress and the President are vital components in the United
States' involvement in a collective security system. The United Nations
is making great strides in achieving world peace, as demonstrated by its
united military front against Iraq. With the breakup of the Soviet
Union, the United States is now the primary player in international
affairs due to its power, prestige, finances, and support of the Charter's
ideals. Although the sovereignty of nation-states is continually diminishing with the development of collective security and a "new world
order," the Constitution should not be disregarded for the convenience
of the international system. For a long time, past Presidents have been
allowed to ignore the command of the Constitution for the sake of collective security and United States influence in world affairs. It is time
for Congress to halt the ever-increasing presidential authority over the
military, lest the United States' armed forces succumb to complete control by the President-the very danger the Framers sought to avoid.
Brian M. Spaid
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